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THE BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM REQUIREMENT
The initial design of the Orbiter flight control system was limited to the quad-redundant com-
puter complex. Systems management and nonavionic functions were contained in a fifth computer, which
was not considered flight critical. This concept was well into development when a blue ribbon panel
was asked to review all aspects of the Approach and Landing Test (ALT) phase of the Space Shuttle Pro-
gram to verify that the design was proper. One of the conclusions reached by the panel was that an
unnecessary risk was being taken by not providing a backup flight control system for the first
flight. This decision was based on the relative complexity of the computer synchronization scheme
being implemented and the lack of a direct manual flight control capability.
It must be remembered that the ALT development occurred during the early seventies when micro-
processors as such did not exist, only four-bit arithmetic chips were available, and software consist-
ed mostly of punched cards implemented in batch mode on a ground computer. Of course, man had gone
to the Moon in an Apollo spacecraft and used a digital computer for navigation and guidance, but
there was also an analog flight control system onboard with both automatic and manual modes avail-
able. Beyond that, a manual direct mode enabled bypassing all the electronics and powering the reac-
tion jets directly. Thus, the step forward to a total computer-controlled flight system was very sig-
nificant and risky according to the blue ribbon panel. Therefore, they recommended a backup mode for
ALT.
That was the background behind the decision to add the backup flight system (BFS). Initially,
it was to be a very simple system installed for ALT only and deleted once confidence had been
developed in the primary flight system. The word simple is very important because one of the main
concerns was the NASA capability to properly verify the large software programs being developed for
the Orbiter. The development of the primary flight system software is addressed in a companion
paper; therefore, that area is not discussed further here.
THE BFS IN THE APPROACH AND LANDING TEST PHASE
The approach taken for the BFS was to develop a very simple and straightforward software program
and then test it in every conceivable manner. The result was a program that contained approximately
12 000 full words including ground checkout and the built-in test program for the computer. The
flight control portion of the software consisted of approximately 6000 words. The remainder was for
the systems management functions, which still had to be performed in the fifth computer along with
the backup autopilot functions. The BFS ALT configuration is shown in figure 1.
Because of the relatively simple program involved, several decisions were made that had major im-
pact later in the Space Shuttle Program. First, Rockwell was given the contract for the BFS and the
contract was an amendment to the vehicle contract. Technically, this arrangement meant that the BFS
was delivered to NASA as part of the vehicle and not as an independent entity like the primary flight
system software. This difference was not significant in ALT since the BFS had a unique set of hard-
ware, the software program was small, and much of the testing was done on the vehicle. During the
Orbital Flight Test (OFT) phase, when the BFS software grew to almost 100 000 words, it became very
difficult to equate the primary and backup software verification efforts and to break out the BFS
software as an independent deliverable product. Second, and even more significant with time, was the
decision to not provide a BFS software development and verification facility at Rockwell. Here a-
gain, it was a logical and proper choice for the ALT BFS but unsatisfactory from the standpoint of
long-term programmatic effects. This subject is addressed later in discussions concerning the BFS in
the OFT phase of the program.
To perform verification, a series of tests was defined using the actual flight-type hardware and
simulated flight conditions. Then, literally hundreds of simulated flights were flown and detailed
performance analysis was conducted. The intent of most BFS tests was to demonstrate that a stable
flightpath could be obtained after engagement from an anomalous initial condition. In fact, the
early ground rule for BFS was to stabilize the vehicle long enough for the crew to bail out. Later,
the importance of completing the mission was stressed. Since the tests did not have to run from sepa-
ration to touchdown every time and the ALT flights lasted less than 30 minutes, quite often it was
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FIGURE 1.- BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM CONFIGURATION.
possible to run five or six tests per hour by merely changing the initial conditions. Figure 2 con-
tains'an overview of the tests performed on the BFS.
With a well-documented set of requirements, a software program that was easy to understand, a
dedicated set of hardware for performing tests, and a combined Rockwell/NASA team of less than 50 com-
patible people, the ALT BFS could be called "the ideal program." Any proposed changes from either
Rockwell or the NASA Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center (JSC) had to be justified. Changes were not
allowed just because they made things easier or took less code or ran faster in the computer. A sig-
nificant improvement in system capability and a requirement for the improvement had to be demonstrat-
ed before a modification was allowed.
One change that was made before the first ALT flight was the technique for acceptance testing of
the software. As stated earlier, the BFS was delivered as part of the vehicle, but it was always
recognized that separation of the software from the total system was desirable from a contractual
standpoint. To accomplish this separation, Rockwell combined with Intermetrics in development of a
FORTRAN simulation of the BFS that would run on a ground-based computer. The program emulated the
AP-101 flight computer and executed the programs one minor cycle at a time. The input data being
used in the emulator and output commands computed from these data were collected each minor cycle
along with cycle counts, error logs, status words, and other pertinent internal computer parameters.
These data were then fed into buffers in multiplexer-demultiplexer (MOM) simulators in a Shuttle
Avionics Test Set (SATS), which could be connected directly to a flight computer. The flight com-
puter then accessed the data buffers by using actual MOM address codes and did computations based
on the data acquired. The general-purpose computer (GPC) outputs were collected each minor cycle
and stored for comparison with the precalculated results from the Intermetrics emulation program.
Many will recognize this technique as being the equivalent of the flight equipment interface de-
vice (FEID) used with the flight computers in the JSC Software Development Laboratory (SDL). The pri-
mary difference was that the BFS technique was used for final tape verification rather than for soft-
ware development. Every parameter in the emulation program and in the calculated answers was carried
out to the full 32-bit word size in the ground processing computer. The flight computer results were
also dumped as 32-bit words, and complete bit-for-bit comparison was made during postprocessing. Only
the last 2 bits of each 32-bit word were allowed to be different before a failure was noted. This
technique was the precursor to the captive simulation (CAPSIM) procedure used by the BFS for verifi-
cation during the OFT flight phase.
THE BFS IN THE ORBITAL FLIGHT TEST PHASE
As the ALT phase of the program neared completion and attention was turned to the OFT phase, sev-
eral conditions became apparent. First, a large portion of the primary flight system software devel-
opment for ALT was unique to that portion of the Space Shuttle Program and could not be used during
OFT. Second, a backup flight system was going to be required and it would have to operate during
both the ascent and the descent portions of the mission. Since some abort options required a once
around the Earth abort or an abort to orbit before reentry, navigation and guidance would have to be
added to the BFS. Suddenly, the BFS had matured to a full guidance, navigation, and control (GN&C)
system and some of the early ALT decisions became very important. As indicated by figure 3, the
BFS no longer is limited to a small subset of dedicated hardware. The BFS GPC is in parallel with
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the primary flight system computers and has full access to all sensor inputs and effector output
changes after engagement.
As mentioned previously, there was an early decision by both Rockwell and NASA program manage-
ment to not provide a software development facility at Rockwell for the BFS. When couched in the con-
text of BFS being used only for ALT and never again, that decision was certainly proper. However,
for OFT, there was a requirement to develop a full-blown BFS with GN&C, systems management (SM),
sequencing, and display capability. Experience with the primary flight system during ALT had
shown that developing the primary flight system software and the SDL simultaneously was almost
an unmanageable effort. Each task was major in regard to the number of highly trained specialists
necessary, and the level of management ability needed was not available at the beginning of the
ALT phase.
Now, the BFS was faced with the same dilemma: how to bring together the massive resources
required to develop some of the most sophisticated software ever attempted while imposing the most
stringent safety and reliability specifications ever conceived. Although the decision may have been
based more on ALT problems than on pure logical reasoning, it was decided that having one contractor
do all programing was not the best choice. Therefore, C. S. Draper Laboratories (CSDL) was selected
to program the GN&C, Intermetrics would program the SM, sequencing, uplink, and ground checkout
functions, and Rockwell would program the operating system, the displays, and the overall integra-
tion. As prime contractor, Rockwell was also responsible for total system verification. The various
levels of integration and verification required by the BFS are shown in figure 4. With the software
tasks broken into three approximately equal sized portions, everything should have gone along in par-
allel until it came together again at the end in a nice, neat package. The first indication of trou-
ble appeared when CSDL had to spend a considerable amount of time developing their best guess of how
the backup system software (BSS) would work. This research was necessary since much of the GN&C is
input/output (I/0) oriented and depends on the timing established by the BSS. Intermetrics developed
preliminary sequencing codes but could not perform any dynamic verification because most of the se-
quences were dependent on guidance and navigation events for which programing had not been done by
CSDL. Rockwell could not spend full time on the BSS because most of their time was spent resolving
integration problems among all three sections of the software. In addition, JSC began asking Rockwell
for their system integration and verification plan and the issue of software validation was drawing
increased attention.
It was in this time frame that the CAPSIM technique became a predominant feature in BFS verifi-
cation. The technique was similar to the emulation program used in ALT but was revised to use actual
code to generate the output data for the comparison program. Precalculated inputs were used as drivers
and placed in the input compools or buffer areas of the computer. The GN&C and sequencing code accessed
these inputs and performed their minor cycle computations. Output results including actuator com-
mands and display signals were then put into output compools, where the data were collected and
stored on tape. All of this was done at CSDL using actual GN&C, sequencing, and, later, SM flight
code, but still with the CSDL version of the operating system. The other limitation was in use of
the CSDL statement level simulator (SLS), which is a non-real-time development tool and thus would
not detect marginal timing conditions or dynamic interactive timing problems between different soft-
ware modules. The CAPSIM data generator procedure is depicted in schematic form in figure 5.
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The next step was to integrate the Draper, Intermetrics, and Rockwell portions of software into
a single load tape for verification at Downey. Computer test sets and mass memory units were not
available for general-purpose use; therefore, a test set tape was made that could be loaded into the
flight computer from a SATS unit. The tape format was tailored to the requirements of the specific
computer in the SATS; therefore, the test set tape was different from the final mass memory load tape
which would be required at JSC. With the flight computer loaded and cabled to the SATS, the opera-
tional BFS was ready for the simulated input data from the CAPSIM program, and, as anticipated, opera-
tion was not smooth initially. The evaluation procedure involved collecting the output buffer data
each minor cycle from the flight computer and then comparing the tabulated data with equivalent data
sets from the CSDL tests.
Approximately 25 test points in ascent and 20 in descent were selected for comparison. Continu-
ous comparison was not possible at first because no automated plotting programs were available. These
programs were developed after 6 to 8 months of the effort and later included dual comparison on the
same plot. If all of this history seems archaic, remember that the BFS started from scratch and had
to compete with the primary system for resources and time on any existing facilities. During the
first 6 months of CAPSIM testing, the BFS was a virtual basket case. When output data were compared,
there were times when it was impossible to determine whether they were from the same program. One of
the main problems consisted of the initial condition values used at CSDL and Rockwell. The guidance
and navigation programs were very sensitive to the data-base parameters, and as many as five or six
different versions could exist at any given time in the various JSC, CSDL, and Rockwell facilities.
The problem is not major in terms of gross performance of the flight system, but when two different
facility tests were overlayed and every discrepancy had to be accounted for, a considerable amount of
time was wasted in trying to explain away what could be a minor difference. Of course, in the begin-
ning, no one was sure whether a minor difference was insignificant or an indication of a potential
major software coding problem.
With time, as everyone began to get a better feeling for the differences in output results and
more of the process became automated, dual comparisons between the BFS and the primary flight system
also were begun. One of the cost-saving features of BFS verification was the so-called "piggyback"
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mode of operation, in which the BFS was to use all applicable data from the primary flight system and
eliminate duplication. The results of one test case showed very close correlation between the pri-
mary and the backup systems and both were found to be wrong. The problem would not have had a major
impact on the flight but did serve to show the danger in not performing total independent analysis.
Afterwards, the BFS people were careful to spot check more test cases and to perform some independent
analysis.
Although the CAPSIM technique was the primary verification tool for the BFS, it did have one se-
rious shortcoming. The test case scenarios were from a cataloged set of runs at CSDL which had been
based on primary flight system testing. Again, this procedure was in accordance with direction to
control development cost and maximize use of existing primary flight system information. The concern
that arose was based on the fact that the BFS would only be engaged after a massive primary flight
system failure. Therefore, the initial conditions could quite possibly be at the limits of the nor-
mal primary GN&C boundary conditions and very few BFS test runs were made from these very abnormal
conditions. Therefore, approximately 100 additional "stress cases" were developed to be run in the
Flight Simulation Laboratory (FSL) in Downey and the Shuttle Avionics Integration Laboratory (SAIL)
at JSC. By combining multiple objectives into one test run, the final number of individual test
runs was refined to 37. Every one of these tests was unique and required special downlist data
formats for additional visibility, and all data analysis was manual. Since these tests were to
be performed one time as a final safety verification check before the first OFT flight, automated
data processing could not be justified. All but a few of these tests were performed successfully,
and failure of the few was due to procedural errors or to a misunderstanding of the intent of
the stress condition. However, adequate data were collected to give the Shuttle community a high
level of confidence in the capability of the BFS to meet its intended objectives for the first
orbital flight.
Some of this confidence waned on launch day, when the BFS failed to synchronize with the primary
flight system a few hours before lift-off. However, the shock to the BFS developers quickly disap-
peared when it was determined that the problem was due to a timing error in the primary system and
that, in fact, the BFS recognized the problem and was trying to inform the launch team that an anoma-
ly existed. When the problem was identified and fully analyzed, it was shown that the mission could
have been flown successfully even with the interface timing error. The BFS would have bypassed the
data being sent in the wrong time slot and corrected itself after engagement had that been necessary.
However, those facts were not available for several days after the launch. A modification was made,
the flight was highly successful, and considerable relief was expressed by all involved. The primary
flight system people said they knew all along the BFS would not be needed but were glad it was there.
The BFS people said they knew they were ready to take over and save the mission but were glad they
did not have to do it.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The BFS has never been required to demonstrate its capability. A proposed on-orbit engagement
and orbital maneuvering system (OMS) engine burn has now been deleted from the list of flight test
requirements. This change is partly the result of a very full and busy flight plan and partly of the
high confidence level which exists in the capability of the BFS to perform when required. Although
most of the people who worked on the backup flight system would like to see it used, I consider it a
supreme compliment from the Program Office and the Flight Directors to accept the system on the faith
of the development and verification program. This acceptance is a tribute to the people and organi-
zations who put so much of themselves into the project for many years.
SUMMARY
In retrospect, several factors or lessons learned in the BFS evolution stand out prominently.
Neither the NASA nor anyone else should ever attempt to develop a software program approaching
100 000 words in size without having the development facilities in place, especially when the require-
ment is for zero-defect software code. In addition to the basic facility, the software analysis and
support tools should be available throughout the project, not near the end. It will always be diffi-
cult to convince a program manager that he should put a sizable amount of his money into a facility
initially for the purpose of saving money several years downstream. But no NASA or contractor pro-
gram manager should again have to experience the trials and tribulations that existed for the primary
flight system in ALT and the backup flight system in OFT. In the end, the only glory is in success.
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FLIGHT SOFTWARE FAULT TOLERANCE VIA THE BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM
Terry D. Humphrey and Charles R. Price
NASA Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center
Houston, Texas 77058
ABSTRACT
A generic software error in the quadruply redundant primary flight system could result in the
catastrophic loss of Space Shuttle vehicle control in the hostile environment of ascent or reentry.
The Space Shuttle backup flight system was designed to protect the crew and vehicle in this eventual-
ity. The significant challenges met in the design and development of this state-of-the-art protec-
tive system is the subject of this paper.
INTRODUCTION
Implementation of the backup flight system (BFS) for the Space Shuttle is a major advance in
state-of-the-art fault-tolerant software in general and in Space Shuttle fault-tolerant flight soft-
ware in particular. The BFS was chartered to protect against a software fault in the most sophisti-
cated flight software system ever implemented: the Space Shuttle primary flight software (PFS). The
PFS is designed to operate a redundant set of general-purpose computers (GPC) to control an innova-
tive, multiple-element, reusable, manned spacecraft through an ensemble of flight regimes never
before encountered by a single vehicle. For STS-1, the PFS consisted of more than 400 000 computer
words of flight code, a complete test of every possible combination of branch instruction or decision
point of which would take more than 10 000 years of computer time on today's fastest computers.
To protect against a latent programing error (software fault) existing in an untried branch com-
bination that would render the Space Shuttle out of control in a critical flight phase, the BFS was
chartered to provide a safety alternative. The BFS is designed to operate in critical flight phases
(ascent and descent) by monitoring the activities of the Space Shuttle flight subsystems that are
under control of the PFS (e.g., navigation, crew interface, propulsion), then, upon manual command by
the flightcrew, to assume control of the Space Shuttle and deliver it to a noncritical flight condi-
tion (safe orbit or touchdown). Many technical, managerial, and operational challenges were experi-
enced by the development team of NASA and its contractors in bringing the BFS from a concept to a
working operational system. The challenges addressed herein are those associated with the selection
of the PFS/BFS system architecture, the internal BFS architecture, the fault-tolerant software mech-
anisms, and the long-term BFS utility.
CHALLENGE 1: A MANAGEABLE SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
Central to any concept of a reusable spacecraft is the theme of higher system reliability
through redundancy of finite-lived components. In the Space Shuttle avionics, the availability of a
properly functioning flight computer is assured through the wiring of five identical GPC's in paral-
lel. Since the memory available for state-of-the-art GPC's at the beginning of the Space Shuttle de-
velopment cycle was much less than the flight software requirements dictated, an early partitioning_
scheme was established. For each of three flight phases (ascent, on-orbit, descent), a redundant
copy of all critical functions was loaded in each of four GPC's and the fifth GPC was loaded with a
complement of useful functions the loss of which could be tolerated. This strategy assured protec-
tion from multiple, sequential computer hardware failures, but did not address the possibility of a
software fault generic to the set of four redundantly programed GPC's causing loss of control of the
Space Shuttle. Concern for such a software fault is valid in that regardless of the number of checks
and balances that are put in place to find and eliminate specification and coding errors in major
software developments, there can be no 100-percent assurance that latent, potentially dangerous soft-
ware errors do not exist in the delivered product.
The obvious strategy for increasing the software reliability of the Space Shuttle was through
software redundancy, but the challenge of the problem was the form of the redundancy to implement
within time and cost constraints. Three redundancy alternatives were available: (1) increasing the
internal PFS redundancy; (2) duplicating the PFS in another software version programed by a different
set of programers completely isolated from the PFS programer, or (3) implementing a reduced-capability
backup system by a semi-isolated set of programers. The first alternative was not pursued because it
was felt that every practical internal measure was already being pursued by the PFS designers. The
second alternative was considered too costly and fraught with duplication of functions not essential
for a secondary system. The third alternative was selected since it afforded an additional measure
of protection that was achievable within cost and schedule constraints. The reduced capability was
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set by a single memory load for both ascent and descent in a single GPC.	 The BFS also assumed the
non-flight-critical functions that had been scheduled for the nonredundant fifth GPC for ascent and
descent. The semi-isolation of the programers was achieved by having the BFS programed by a contrac-
tor geographically separated from the PFS contractor.
THE BFS FAULT-TOLERANT ARCHITECTURE
Significant challenges were faced by the designers to develop a BFS which would closely track
the PFS, protect itself and the PFS from data pollution from each other, and also be ready at any
point in the ascent, abort, or descent profile to take over control of the vehicle safely when manu-
ally engaged by the crew. To provide this capability, a technique had to be developed that would pro-
vide for tight synchronization of the BFS to the PFS in order to prevent divergence, but that would
also protect both from inducing faults in the other. A more pollution-protective technique than that
used for PFS redundant-set synchronization had to be developed. To protect the PFS from faulty 13FS
data or timing, this technique would permit no transfer of data from the BFS to the PFS.
An innovative technique for synchronization of the BFS and the PFS was developed using flight-
critical data bus input profile tracking of the PFS that involves use of the input/output processor
(IOP) input data bus listen capability and the transfer of input profile and minor cycle data from
the PFS to the BFS. The BFS protects itself from pollution by erroneous input profile data by voting
on the redundant data sent to it by the individual PFS GPC's. In addition, the BFS protects itself
from input profile timing faults of the PFS by the use of its own data bus timing window thresholds
for each of the individual groups of input profile data.
To protect the BFS and PFS from pollution by erroneous data received from one another, an in-
terface design policy was established which allowed no transfer of software-generated data from the
BFS to the PFS but did allow data absolutely essential to the proper tracking of the PFS to be trans-
ferred and used by the BFS. The absence of data transfer to the PFS prevents any pollution of the
redundant PFS by the BFS. The BFS was designed to protect itself from pollution from erroneous PFS
data first, by being limited to the use of a small amount of absolutely essential transfer data; sec-
ond, by performing a vote on the redundant sets of data obtained from the redundant PFS GPC's; and
third, by performing reasonableness checks on the voted data.
Another challenge faced in the development of the fault-tolerant BFS was the design of a safe
method of taking control of the vehicle at any point in the flight profile without inducing control
effector transients which might endanger the crew and the vehicle. The design developed to provide
this protection required the input of engage initialization data from the subsystems via the flight-
critical data buses immediately after BFS engagement. These data were then used to ensure that subse-
quent BFS control commands did not overstress or generate significant transients on the control effec-
tor subsystem.
One of the foremost innovative techniques used in the BFS fault-tolerant design was developed to
provide for recovery from the loss of PFS-generated master events controller (MEC) sequencing as well
as for attempting recovery from BFS GPC hardware or software errors. The loss of MEC sequencing com-
mands might occur either as a result of a generic PFS software failure or as a result of the abrupt
termination of all PFS-controlled flight-critical data buses at BFS engagement. Recovery from these
types of errors is provided by the BFS software restart technique. A software restart is initiated
upon BFS engagement, and, in the event that critical MEC command sequences are found not to have been
properly performed, the BFS reinitiates the full MEC sequence of commands for the appropriate mission
event.
The use of the restart technique to attempt recovery from BFS GPC hardware or software errors
was developed to protect the BFS from transient errors and, in the case of hard errors, to continue
attempts at recovery in hopes that the error will not persist. This restart recovery involves re-
initialization of input/output (I/0) and restarting of BFS application processing at the beginning of
a new GPC major processing cycle. The restart recovery technique provides this protection for both
the preengaged and engaged modes of BFS operation.
A MOVING TARGET: MAINTAINING TRACK OF SOFTWARE CHANGES
Unlike the Approach and Landing Test (ALT) PFS, the BFS for ALT could not be used as a base upon
which to build Orbital Flight Test (OFT) software. The BFS software for ALT was designed and de-
veloped by Charles Stark Draper Laboratories and provided backup for flight control functions only,
provided no CRT/crew interface, and provided only a very minimal task-list-type executive. Rockwell
was selected to develop the BFS for OFT and essentially started anew about 2 years behind the PFS
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software development. A new operating system had to be designed and developed, all existing PFS re-
quirements and change requests (CR's) had to be reviewed for applicability to the BFS, and an overall
BFS software design had to be developed. The BFS not only had to catch up with the PFS level of matu-
rity very quickly, but then had to maintain pace with a very large amount of PFS requirements develop-
ment and software change activity. A significant amount of effort and manpower was required to accom-
plish this goal.
POST-OFT UTILITY OF THE BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM
The BFS was initially envisioned to be used only through the Shuttle OFT flights. The expecta-
tion was that after OFT, the entire Shuttle system design, including PFS software, would be proven
safe for operational use and, therefore, the BFS would no longer be needed. Close to the end of OFT,
an examination was undertaken to assess the need for continuing the use of the BFS. Assessments of
the PFS software discrepancy report (DR) traffic showed it to correlate proportionally to the level
of PFS software change traffic but, even in cases in which software change traffic was small, the num-
ber of DR's appeared to decay exponentially rather than to drop abruptly. These data indicated that
latent software errors had high levels of persistence. This information was used in conjunction with
the projections of PFS software change traffic for future flights. It was determined that for a sig-
nificant time in the future, the PFS software change traffic would continue to remain at significant
levels and therefore the risks would remain high for latent PFS software errors. Therefore, it was
concluded that for at least a significant time in the future, the BFS would be needed to protect
against generic PFS software faults.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Rockwell International Specification: Backup Flight System Program Requirements Document
Overview. Rockwell International MG038100, 1979.
Rockwell International Specification: Primary Avionics Software System (PASS) and Backup
Flight System (BFS) Software Interface. Rockwell International ICD-3-0068-03, 1981.
Rockwell International Specification: Backup System Services Program Requirements Document.
Rockwell International MG038101, 1982.
37
